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INTRODUCTION
Measures to limit punitive damage claims were key features of
Vice President Quayle's proposed Agenda for CivilJustice Reform.'
These measures were not entirely new, however. Both the Reagan
and the Bush administrations supported proposals, some of which
were quite drastic, to limit punitive damages awards. Among the
proposals were measures to curtail the availability2 and size3 of pu-
nitive awards, to make the awards more difficult to obtain,4 and to
eliminate punitive awards almost entirely in cases where the product
causing harm complied with federal regulations. 5 It is the last cate-
gory of proposals involving products subject to regulatory compli-
ance that is the subject of this Article.
Specifically, this Article examines proposals supported by the
Bush administration that would ban punitive damages in cases
where products are closely regulated and subject to government ap-
proval before being marketed. A recent example of such a proposal
was Senate bill 640, the Product Liability Fairness Act.6 The bill
1. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA 8, 22 (Aug. 1991) [hereinafter AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM] (suggesting that
punitive damages be awarded in separate proceedings, under clear and convincing standard,
and not in excess of compensatory damages award); see also Dan Quayle, Civiljustice Reform, 41
AM. U. L. REV. 559, 561-69 (1992) (discussing key items on civil justice reform agenda).
2. See S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(a) (1991) (stipulating that "punitive damages
may not be awarded in the absence of a compensatory award" except when alleged harm is
death or when state law provides for punitive damages only); see also S. 44, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 12(a)(2) (1984) (stating that "punitive damages may not be assessed in the absence of
liability for compensatory damages").
3. See AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 1, at 22 (limiting punitive damages
to amount awarded for compensatory damages); see also U.S. ATTORNEY GEN., REPORT OF THE
TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CUR-
RENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 68 (1986) [hereinafter A'ORNEY
GENERAL'S REPORT] (limiting noneconomic damages, including punitive damages, to
$100,000).
4. See, e.g., S. 640, supra note 2, § 303(a) (allowing punitive damages to be awarded only
to claimants who establish through clear and convincing evidence that injuries resulted from
defendants' "conscious, flagrant indifference" to claimants' safety); H.R. 1115, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 207(a) (1988) (requiring that claimants show through clear and convincing evi-
dence that defendants' conduct could result in punitive damages claim under applicable state
law); AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 1, at 22 (arguing that jury's determination
of punitive damages award should only be based on clear and convincing evidence); Quayle,
supra note 1, at 565 (positing that punitive damages awards be based on standard of proof
requiring element of intent and that juries should base awards on clear and convincing evi-
dence). Another proposal gives product manufacturers the right to ask for a separate pro-
ceeding to determine whether punitive damages should be awarded and the amount of the
award. See S. 640, supra note 2, § 303(d) (allowing defendant to request that punitive damages
be considered in separate proceeding).
5. See H.R. 1115, supra note 4, § 207(d) (exempting certain FDA-approved drugs and
devices from purview of punitive damages awards).
6. S. 640, supra note 2. The Bush administration expressed strong support for the bill.
S. REP. No. 215, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1991). After completion of this Article, a similar
product liability reform measure was introduced in the 103rd Congress. S. 687, 103d Cong.,
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called for a general ban on punitive damages, absent fraud, for three
product categories: drugs and devices approved by or meeting the
standards of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and aircraft
approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 7 While
Senate bill 640 was not enacted,8 a handful of states in recent years
has adopted similar provisions banning punitive damages for gov-
ernment-approved products. 9
The proposed reform is not draconian. It provides a regulatory
compliance defense for only certain categories of products and does
not apply at all to compensatory damages.10 The suggested reform
includes exceptions that permit punitive damages in cases of serious
misconduct."1 Still, the measure is worrisome because it removes an
important safety incentive from the manufacturers of products that
are among the most high-risk items in the marketplace.
Proponents of the reform counter that there is little need for pu-
nitive damages in cases of drugs, devices, and aircraft because the
comprehensive regulatory schemes for these products are adequate
to ensure their safety. 12 Further, proponents claim that the reform
is badly needed in order to limit punitive damages awards that are
out of control and "overdeterring" the development of these so-
cially useful products.
13
1st Sess. (1993). Although its provisions on punitive damages liability are quite similar to
those in S. 640, there are some differences, which are noted infra, note 11.
7. S. 640, supra note 2, § 303(c)(1)-(2) (exempting from punitive damages any drug or
device subject to premarket approval by FDA that was subsequently approved, and exempting
any aircraft product subject to premarket approval that was subsequently certified by FAA and
continues to comply with standards for airworthiness).
8. See Product Liability Bill Dies in Senate After Supporters Fail To End Filibuster, 20 Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 995-96 (Sept. 11, 1992) (noting that bill died on September 10,
1992, when Senate was twice unable to obtain 60 votes needed to end filibuster mounted by
opponents to bill).
9. See, e.g., infra note 17 and accompanying text (describing various state statutes that
prohibit punitive damages awards in cases involving FDA-approved drug or drug that com-
plied with FDA terms, conditions, or regulations).
10. See S. 640, supra note 2, § 303 (imposing limitations on punitive damages alone); see
also S. 687, supra note 6, § 203 (same).
11. See S. 640, supra note 2, § 303(c)(1)(B)-(c)(2)(C) (excepting punitive damages limita-
tions when defendant either withheld or misrepresented material and relevant information
from Government or when defendant made illegal payment to FDA in attempt to secure
agency approval of product); accord S. 687, supra note 6, §§ 203(b)(2)(B), (c)(2)(B) (excepting
punitive damages for misdeeds identified in S. 640 and including illegal payment to FDA and
FAA that had not been covered in S. 640.); S. 687, supra note 6, § 203(b)(2)(A) (exempting
manufacturers who fail to meet their post-sale obligations to report adverse effects to FDA,
which was not specifically provided in S. 640).
12. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (noting that proponents often argue that
because FDA-regulated products must satisfy agency standards prior to their marketing and
sale, agencies provide adequate assurances that products will be safe).
13. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (detailing contention that products having
great societal value should not be subject to punitive damages because such damages deter
product development).
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This Article explores these claims. It challenges the idea that gov-
ernment regulation can be relied on to assure product safety and
argues that the recent history of government deregulation in the
Reagan and Bush administrations clearly refutes that notion. The
Article also challenges the widespread notion that punitive damages
are excessively high and are awarded routinely without sufficient
grounds. The Article concludes that even a limited regulatory com-
pliance defense, as proposed in Senate bill 640, cannot be justified.
I. MEASURES To LIMIT PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR REGULATED
PRODUCTS
A. Proposed and Enacted Reforms
Only recently has federal product liability reform legislation in-
cluded provisions banning punitive damages for specific regulated
products. Earlier measures attempted to limit punitive damages' 4
and others tried to create strengthened regulatory compliance de-
fenses,' 5 but there had not been a provision combining regulatory
compliance and punitive damage limits. The Uniform Product
Safety Act of 1988 proposed such a provision. 16 Like a handful of
state tort reform laws, 17 the bill banned punitive damages in cases of
drugs and devices approved by the FDA.18 The preliminary version
14. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (discussing proposals to limit damages
through various methods).
15. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (noting Uniform Products Liability Act and
Uniform Product Safety Act as two provisions attempting to develop regulatory compliance
defense).
16. H.R. 1115, supra note 4, § 207(d)(1).
17. A vast majority of the states have enacted tort and product liability reform measures
in the past decade. In only a small number of states, however, has the reform legislation
included provisions limiting punitive damages in cases of regulated products. Where states
have adopted such provisions, they have limited protection to FDA-approved drugs and de-
vices. Five states (Arizona, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and Utah) have limits on punitive
damages in cases of FDA-approved drugs. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (1992) (prohib-
iting punitive or exemplary damages when drug is manufactured and labeled according to
FDA requirements or is generally recognized as safe and effective by FDA); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:58C-5(c) (West 1987) (precluding punitive damages if food or drug is approved or li-
censed by FDA or is generally regarded by FDA as safe and effective); OnIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.80(c) (Anderson 1991) (prohibiting punitive damages if drug is manufactured accord-
ing to FDA terms of approval or license absent fraud); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927 (1991) (pro-
scribing punitive damages if drug is either labeled and manufactured pursuant to FDA terms
of approval or license or is generally recognized as safe and effective by FDA); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-18-2 (1992) (denying claimant punitive damages when drug either received
premarket approval or licensing from FDA or is generally regarded as safe and effective by
FDA); see also S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 37 n. 195 (1991) (listing states that have enacted
statutes prohibiting punitive damages in cases involving FDA-approved drugs).
18. See H.R. 1115, supra note 4, § 207(d)(1) (precluding awards of punitive damages for
harms caused by FDA-approved drugs and devices absent intentional and wrongful withhold-
ing or misrepresentation of information required for submission to FDA or relating to safety
and efficacy of drug or device or absent violation of Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
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of the Act also banned punitive damages in cases of aircraft certified
by the FAA. 19
Several years later, the Product Liability Fairness Act, Senate bill
640, proposed a similar ban on punitive damages for products regu-
lated by the FDA and the FAA.20 Specifically, the legislation pro-
scribed punitive damages for prescription drugs and devices subject
to premarket approval, as well as over-the-counter drugs subject to
more general FDA regulation. 21 In addition, Senate bill 640 prohib-
ited punitive damages for aircraft that had been certified by the FAA
and were in compliance with postsale airworthiness requirements. 22
The bans on punitive damages in Senate bill 640, however, were not
absolute. The legislation recognized two significant exceptions that
limited the impact of the bans. First, the bill included a fraud excep-
tion that applied to all three groups of products: drugs, devices,
and aircraft. 23 Second, the bill included a bribery exception applica-
ble to drug and device manufacturers. 24 The last exception had not
appeared in earlier legislation,2 5 but was necessitated by a recent
highly publicized scandal at the FDA involving generic drug manu-
facturers. 26 With these exceptions, Senate bill 640 assured that pu-
nitive damages would continue to be available in most cases
involving egregious misconduct.
B. Origins of the Reform Measures
The provisions of Senate bill 640 borrow features from two differ-
ent areas of tort reform. They combine a limit on punitive damages,
19. Id. § 208(c)(2). The bill as approved by the House Energy and Commerce Commit-
tee, however, did not include the provisions banning punitive damages for aircraft approved
by the FAA. See id. § 207(d) (banning punitive damages for FDA-approved drugs and devices
only).
20. See S. 640, supra note 2, § 303(c)(1) (exempting from punitive liability those drugs
and devices either subject to premarket approval by FDA and subsequently approved or gen-
erally recognized as safe and effective by FDA).
21. Id § 303(c)(1)(A)-(B).
22. Id § 303(c)(2) (precluding punitive awards in cases involving aircraft where aircraft
was subject to premarket certification by FAA, was approved, and subsequently complied with
FAA standards concerning airworthiness).
23. See id. §§ 303(c)(1)(B), (c)(2)(C) (subjecting to punitive damages those defendants
who made misrepresentations to or withheld material information from Federal Government
about performance of their products).
24. See id. § 303(c)(1)(B) (stipulating that defendants who make illegal payments to FDA
officials to secure product approval are subject to punitive damages).
25. See H.R. 1115, supra note 4, § 207(d)(1) (providing that ban on punitive damages
would not apply to manufacturers of drugs and devices if they withheld from or misrepre-
sented to government officials material information about performance of their products).
26. See Larry Thompson, How Safe Are the Drugs You Take? Scandal at FDA Raises New Ques-
tions About Generic Medicines, WASH. PosT, Aug. 22, 1989, (Health Magazine) at 12 (describing
bribery scandal involving FDA official and crisis it caused for FDA); see also infra notes 61-63
and accompanying text (explaining that FDA scandal involved generic drug company that
bribed FDA employees to approve drug company's products).
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which has been a popular subject of tort reform in the states, with a
regulatory compliance defense, which has not generated as much
interest.
1. Legislative reforms to limit punitive damages
The hue and cry over punitive damages during the past decade
has resulted in a "dizzying array" 27 of legislation enacted around
the country to curb punitive damages. 28 Proposals to limit punitive
damages awards also have been part of proposed federal product
liability legislation. 29 Senate bill 640, for example, included a
number of provisions governing punitive damages claims. The bill
defined the conduct required for a punitive damages award 0 and
established a uniform standard of proof in such cases. 3' The bill
also gave defendants the right to separate proceedings to determine
punitive awards32 and listed factors to be used in calculating the
amount of such awards. 33 Thus, the provisions banning punitive
damages for FDA- and FAA-approved products were only part of a
much broader scheme to limit punitive damages awards.
2. Reforms to strengthen the regulatory compliance defense
Reforms to strengthen the regulatory compliance defense have
not been widely adopted in the states. Although many proponents
of product liability reforms have urged a stronger role for regula-
tory compliance, 34 including making compliance a complete defense
27. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND
PROCESS 302 (2d ed. 1992).
28. See id. at 859 (showing that more than half of states enacted some punitive damages
measures between 1986 and 1991); see also Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Of to the Races".
The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207, 220-22 (1990) (listing
most frequently enacted state tort reform measures between 1985-1986).
29. See, e.g., Product Liability Act, S. 44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12 (1983) (attempting to
limit availability of punitive damages); H.R. 1115, supra note 4, § 207(d)(I) (proscribing avail-
ability of punitive damages for FDA-approved drugs and devices); Uniform Product Liability
Act (UPLA) § 108(c), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) (providing defendants with compliance de-
fense, which could be rebutted by plaintiff by preponderance of evidence that product was
defective).
30. See S. 640, supra note 2, § 303(a) (requiring "conduct manifesting a. ... conscious,
flagrant indifference to the safety" of user as standard for assessing punitive damages).
31. See id. (requiring clear and convincing evidence showing by plaintiff to obtain puni-
tive damages).
32. Id. § 303(d).
33. See id. § 303(e) (stipulating that following factors should be considered when deter-
mining amount of punitive damages: (1) financial condition of defendant and profitability of
challenged conduct; (2) number of products sold; (3) severity of harm to plaintiff; (4) other
punitive awards already imposed or that may be imposed for defendant's conduct; and (5)
imposition of any criminal penalties or civil fines for conduct).
34. See, e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY
REPORTER'S STUDY 83-110 (1991) [hereinafter ALI, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILrrY] (maintaining
that "[a]t a minimum, regulatory compliance should preclude the award of any punitive dam-
[Vol. 42:1335
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under certain conditions,35 recent federal product liability legisla-
tion has not incorporated a broad regulatory compliance defense36
and few states have enacted such reforms.3 7 Even with the "nation-
wide burst" of tort reform statutes adopted throughout the country
in the 1980s,38 this particular reform measure has not fared well.
The question now is whether a narrower version of the compliance
defense, as contained in Senate bill 640, will be more palatable to
legislators at the state and federal level if it is promoted as a way of
limiting the increasingly unpopular punitive damages award.
ages"); James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Designs: A Proposed
Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REV. 625, 632 (1978) (arguing for regulatory compliance defense
in defective design cases if defendant proves by preponderance of evidence that product com-
plied with federal regulatory standards unless plaintiff can show by clear and convincing evi-
dence that such standards were inadequate); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The
Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 329-35 (1985) (arguing
that courts should be required to defer to expert decisions of regulatory agencies regarding
product design).
35. See ALI, ENTERPRISE LIABILITY, supra note 34, at 110 (stating that there is "persuasive
case for making regulatory compliance a complete bar to tort liability once certain carefully-
defined conditions have been satisfied respecting the regulation").
36. See Uniform Products Liability Act (UPLA) § 108(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979)
(providing that product complying with government regulation should be deemed nondefec-
tive, but allowing plaintiff to show otherwise by preponderance of evidence). UPLA's compli-
ance defense did not alter the plaintiff's burden of proving defectiveness in any significant
way. A similar provision was included in the Uniform Product Safety Act. See H.R. 1115, supra
note 4, § 207(d)(1) (1988) (precluding use of regulatory compliance defense upon showing of
intentional withholding or misrepresentation of information or fraud). An early measure in
the Senate, the Product Liability Act, S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), contained no
regulatory compliance defense. See S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1982) (stat-
ing that committee did not include regulatory compliance defense in bill). In considering the
legislation, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation heard conflict-
ing testimony on the issue and concluded that it needed further study. Id. More recent legis-
lation has also not included the broad regulatory compliance defense. See S. 640, supra note 2,
§ 303 (providing regulatory compliance defense for punitive damages only).
37. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403 (West 1987) (stating that injurious prod-
uct is rebuttably presumed not defective and maker not negligent if product conforms to
either "state of the art" pursuant to industry standards or any code, standard, or regulation
regarding product promulgated by state or federal agency); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304 (1983
& Supp. 1987) (providing compliance defense for products conforming to legislative or ad-
ministrative standards unless it is shown by preponderance of evidence that reasonably pru-
dent manufacturer would have taken additional precautions); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-
05(3) (1991) (stipulating that products in compliance with government standards as to manu-
facturing, testing, and inspecting are rebuttably presumed not defective); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-28-104 (1978 & Supp. 1987) (stating that compliance with federal or state statute or
regulation raises rebuttable presumption that product is not unreasonably dangerous); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (1992) (allowing rebuttable presumption that product is free from
defects when product conforms with government standards). These statutes all create pre-
sumptions that regulatory compliance constitutes reasonable safety measures.
38. See Sanders &Joyce, supra note 28, at 210 n.13 (noting that only two states-Penn-
sylvania and Vermont-did not enact some kind of tort reform legislation during latter half of
1980s).
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II. THE REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE
A. Arguments for Judicial Deference to Regulatory Standards
Before considering the narrow version of the regulatory compli-
ance defense contained in Senate bill 640, it is helpful to review the
pros and cons of the broader defense. Its proponents argue, among
other things, that the judicial system should defer to safety stan-
dards set by regulatory agencies because the agencies have greater
expertise than the courts in assessing risks and in determining what
constitutes reasonable product safety.39 They argue that the current
dual system of tort and regulatory standards makes it impossible for
manufacturers to know what standards they must meet,40 and that
judicial deference to the regulatory system would create much-
needed uniformity in product safety standards. 4 1 Proponents of the
regulatory compliance defense contend that no additional safety in-
centives from the tort system are needed to supplement the regula-
tory system.
42
B. Judicial Treatment of Regulatory Compliance
Courts reject these arguments almost uniformly and refuse to
treat regulatory standards as equivalent to the standards of safety
required by tort law.43 Instead, courts regard regulatory standards
39. See W. Kip Viscusi & Michael Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship Between Product Lia-
bility and Innovation, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 125 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991)
(arguing that courts should take advantage of government regulatory agencies' expertise be-
cause agencies' wealth of specialized knowledge makes them better suited than courts for
making certain society-wide judgments). See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review
of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531,
1555-56 (1973) (stating that complete deference to Government in standard setting is best
course for courts); Huber, supra note 34, at 332-35 (encouraging deference by courts to agen-
cies because of agencies' unique abilities to balance risks).
40. See, e.g., ALI, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILrrY, supra note 34, at 88-89 (arguing that dual
system creates "combination of legal constraints, delays, and uncertainties that imposes spe-
cial burdens on new products and processes and threatens innovation").
41. See ALI, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 34, at 87-89 (arguing against dual
remedial system consisting of both regulation and liability because such system creates danger
of overdeterrence).
42. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW 110-12 (1980) (noting
comprehensive nature of agency review of drugs and arguing that agency standards should be
both maximum and minimum requirements); Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, Overview, in
THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 1, 13 (Peter
W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (arguing that specific liability verdicts have not pro-
duced substantially safer products, but asserting that regulation is "the most important gov-
ernment factor in ensuring safety of pharmaceuticals and aircraft"); John D. Graham, Product
Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety, in THE LIABILrrY MAZE, supra, at 120, 183 (finding that con-
sumer demands, regulation, and professional responsibility, and not threat of product liabil-
ity, are all that is necessary to achieve product safety improvements).
43. See 4 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
ITFPL-77/02, PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY 137 (1977) (finding
that so few cases treated regulatory compliance as complete defense that it is not even minor-
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as minimum standards of safety under the tort system that are rele-
vant but not necessarily deserving of special weight in determining
liability.44 There are two primary reasons for this result. First,
courts often find that a given regulatory standard definition is a mat-
ter of legislative intent45 with some statutes explicitly precluding the
use of tort standards of care as the regulatory safety standard.46
Whether such intent is explicitly stated or not, courts seldom find
the adoption of regulatory standards, which would have the effect of
protecting compliant manufacturers from tort liability, to be consis-
tent with the safety aims of these statutes.47 Second, courts reject
regulatory standards in circumstances where their adoption would
run counter to common law standards of liability. Examples of this
might include situations where regulations are outdated or clearly
unsuitable as standards of care,48 or where inadequacies in the regu-
latory process or the misconduct of a product manufacturer would
make the regulatory compliance defense inappropriate.
49
ity rule); Paul Dueffert, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
175, 175-76 (1989) (noting that courts generally admit compliance with government statutes
and regulations regarding defendant's exercise of due care, and that courts view such regula-
tions and statutes as merely establishing minimum standards); Teresa M. Schwartz, The Role of
Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1121, 1123 (1988) [here-
inafter Schwartz, Federal Safety Regulations] (finding that courts have always treated compliance
with regulatory and statutory standards as measure of minimum, not maximum, tort law
standard).
44. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir.) (holding
that government regulations occupy "the floor of safe conduct... [not] a ceiling on the ability
of states to protect their citizens"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); MacDonald v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass.) (rejecting contention that FDA warning
requirements preempt or define common duty to warn), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985). But
see Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 98-99 (Utah 1991) (providing immunity from strict
liability based on design defects in FDA-approved prescription drugs because of agency's ex-
tensive regulatory system). For a discussion of Grundberg, see Teresa M. Schwartz, Product
Liability Reform by theJudiciary, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 303, 326-27, 332-33 (1991-1992) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Product Liability Reform].
45. See, e.g., Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir. 1973) (find-
ing that Flammable Fabrics Act was not intended to establish standards of flammability for
tort liability); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1324-25 (Or. 1978) (noting that
nothing in Federal Aviation Act or its legislative history indicates intent for FAA standards to
bind common law courts in tort actions).
46. See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act § 108(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c)
(1988) (providing that compliance with auto safety standards "does not exempt any person
from any liability under common law").
47. One rationale for adopting a regulatory standard as the appropriate tort standard is
to further the safety goals of the statute. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS
191 (4th ed. 1971). A regulatory compliance defense, however, constricts common law liabil-
ity and therefore seldom would further the aims of enhancing safety.
48. See, e.g., Raymond, 484 F.2d at 1027 (noting that material that could burst into flames
two seconds after contact with heat source complied with federal flammability standards that
had not been changed in 14 years).
49. See, e.g., McDaniel v. McNeil Lab., 241 N.W.2d 822, 828 (Neb. 1976) (stipulating that
evidence of fraud or nondisclosure to FDA by manufacturer allows FDA determinations con-
cerning drugs to be challenged).
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C. Flaws in the Regulatory System
1. General concerns about the regulatory system
There are a number of reasons beyond those offered by the courts
that explain why regulatory standards should not displace tort stan-
dards of safety. One of the reasons is the problem of regulatory
"lag" between the time that regulations should be and are issued or
updated. 50 Lag results because agencies do not have the necessary
resources to assure that all regulations are current,5 1 or, because
the agencies might not have the political will to act.52 The influence
of industry groups on the regulatory process is also worrisome. Un-
like other interested parties such as consumer groups, industry
members have considerable resources to devote to influencing the
regulatory process, 53 and in addition, they have data that the agen-
cies need to regulate the industries.54 Given the significant role that
industry groups play in the development of regulatory standards, it
should come as no surprise that the courts are reluctant to adopt
such regulatory standards as the common law rules of conduct for
those same industries.
2. Special concerns about the regulatory system under former Presidents
Reagan and Bush
Concerns about the adequacy of the regulatory system, which
have long been reflected in the judicial treatment of regulatory stan-
50. See ALI, ENTERPRISE LIABILITY, supra note 34, at 85 (noting that there is often lag
between time risks are created by enterprises and time curative regulations are adopted).
51. A recent thorough study of the FDA by an advisory committee chaired by former
FDA Commissioner, Dr. Charles Edwards, identified the lack of resources as a recurring
theme in the FDA's history. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. AnvIsoRY COMM.,
FINAL REPORT ON THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 39 (1991) [hereinafter EDWARDS RE-
PORT] (finding that FDA's "grave" resource limitations impose "staggering burdens" on
Agency). According to the report, "[t]he challenge posed by rapidly changing technology is
as much a constant for the [FDA] as the chronic shortage of funds." Id. at 4. Those associ-
ated with the FDA, from former department officials and employees to business and consumer
representatives, described the Agency as "overextended, underfunded and shackled by bu-
reaucratic constraints." Id. at 5-6. The report concluded that even though the FDA's work-
load continues to increase, it is unlikely that the Agency will be able to increase its number of
employees or be given a commensurate increase in funds. Id. at C-13. These same concerns
about inadequate resources had appeared in similar advisory committee reports in 1955 and
1962. Id at 3-4.
52. See ALI, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 34, at 86 (stating that "[r]egulatory
agency 'failure' may occur because of inadequate resources or on account of political and
bureaucratic pressures").
53. PETER QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 13 (1981).
54. See JOAN CLAYBROOK, RETREAT FROM SAFETY: REAGAN'S ATrACK ON AMERICA'S
HEALTH xxiv-xxv (1984) (claiming that regulated industries have information that U.S. Gov-
ernment needs to promulgate appropriate regulations). Cuts in an agency's budget preclude
it from independently gathering information, thus forcing the agency to rely on industry data.
Id. at xxiv. In such cases, the Government "has far less information than the regulated indus-
try with which to make key regulatory decisions." Id.
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dards, have been heightened in recent years as a result of the de-
regulatory agendas of both the Reagan and Bush administrations. 55
While commentators generally consider the Reagan administration
to have been more antiregulatory than the Bush administration,
56
both administrations in fact adopted procedures that markedly in-
creased the influence of industry in the regulatory process, mostly
through secret processes that were outside public view.57 The be-
hind-the-scenes maneuvering during these two administrations to
kill or undercut agency-proposed regulations caused an already
slow system to be further delayed, thereby exacerbating problems of
regulatory lag.5s In addition, a moratorium on federal regulations
imposed during the Bush administration brought the regulatory
process to a virtual halt.59 Both the Bush and Reagan administra-
tions reduced the role of government by cutting back on agency
budgets.
60
It was perhaps inevitable that in this lax, antiregulatory environ-
55. See id. at 58-70 (describing antiregulatory actions of Reagan administration in prod-
uct safety area); Teresa M. Schwartz, A Product Safety Agenda for the 1990s, 45 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1355, 1355-68 (1988) [hereinafter Schwartz, Product Safety Agenda] (describing Reagan
administration's antagonistic approach to regulation and product liability claims).
56. See, e.g., Bob DavisJanuary Surprise: Bush Plans To Unveil a 90-Day Moratorium on New
Regulations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1992, at Al (describing Bush as "Reregulation President"
during his first three years in office until he took "a page out of Reagan's book" and proposed
regulatory moratorium as part of plan to address floundering economy).
57. In the Reagan administration, industry members were invited by high-level officials
to seek relief from regulations at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Relief was
sought behind the scenes and without public knowledge or an equal opportunity for the pub-
lic to have input. See SUSAN J. TOLCHIN & MARTIN TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE
RUSH To DEREGULATE 73-85 (1983) (describing OMB's role in rebuking agency regulatory
initiatives). In the Bush administration the President's Council on Competitiveness, chaired
by former Vice President Quayle, played a similar role, intervening to curb agency regula-
tions, always behind the scenes without public scrutiny so as to leave "no fingerprints." See
Bob Woodward & David S. Broder, Quayle's Quest: Curb Rules, Leave "No Fingeprints, " WASH.
POST, Jan. 9, 1992, at AI (stating that Quayle's Council on Competitiveness was "command
post for a war against government regulation... [that] intervened in dozens of unpublicized
controversies" involving important federal regulatory issues).
58. See NANCY WALTZMAN & CHRISTINE TRIANO, VOODOO ACCOUNTING: THE TOLL OF
PRESIDENT BUSH'S REGULATORY MORATORIUM JANUARY-AUGUST 1992 7-8 (1992) (noting that
during Bush administration, Council on Competitiveness delayed implementation of many
regulations, including labeling rules under Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990);
Schwartz, Product Safety Agenda, supra note 55, at 1363-64 (detailing OMB's intervention during
Reagan administration to stop FDA's proposal to require that labels on aspirin containers
warn of Reye's Syndrome risks, causing four-year delay between regulation's proposal and its
enactment).
59. See generally WALTZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 58, at 2-17 (describing various regula-
tory concerns that were either eliminated, delayed, or weakened by Bush administration be-
tween January-August 1992).
60. See EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 51, at 47 (finding that between fiscal years 1991 and
1992, President Bush cut budget request for FDA by more than $117 million and urged estab-
lishment of user fee to make up difference). In the Reagan administration, some of the largest
cutbacks occurred in the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), which suffered
budget cuts of 257o and staff cuts of close to 30%. See CLAYBROOK, supra note 54, at 60-61
(stating that few agencies have experienced magnitude of CPSC's mid-1980s budget losses).
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ment, a scandal would occur like the one that arose at the FDA in
the late 1980s. The scandal, which involved the bribery of FDA em-
ployees by generic drug company officials to gain governmental ap-
proval of their products, was detected and "vigorously pursued" 6'
by private sector and federal investigators, not by the FDA. 62 The
scandal was certainly a low point in the history of one of the Federal
Government's most respected regulatory agencies. 63 While there
has been no indication that safety was actually compromised as a
result of this scandal,64 the incident does serve as a dramatic re-
minder of the flaws that exist in the regulatory system, even with
respect to agencies that regulate comprehensively and are required
to approve products before marketing.
If there was ever a time when a strengthened compliance defense
should not have been adopted, it was during the twelve antiregu-
latory years of the Bush and Reagan administrations. Even in a
more pro-consumer era,65 however, the problems in the regulatory
system such as the pervasive role of industry, regulatory lag, and the
lack of adequate agency resources will continue to exist. These are
inherent characteristics of the regulatory system that cannot be
eliminated entirely, and they serve to underscore the importance of
a vital tort system as an independent incentive for product safety.
Many of the reasons mentioned previously for opposing a general
regulatory compliance defense also apply, perhaps with less force,
to the narrowly crafted defense contained in Senate bill 640. In the
next Part, the pros and cons of the more limited defense are
explored.
61. EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 51, at 1.
62. EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 51, at 1.
63. As a result of the scandal, a special advisory committee was established to review all
operations of the Agency and a new FDA commissioner was appointed to restore confidence
in the Agency. See EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 51, at 6 (noting that Dr. David Kessler was
selected to head newly formed committee and to serve as commissioner).
64. See EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 51, at 6 (finding that public health was not
threatened by shortcomings brought to light in report); see also Paul W. Valentine, More Indict-
ments Expected in Generic Drug Probe, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1990, at A4 (stating that U.S. Attor-
ney indicated that there had been no finding of harm caused by generic drugs despite
industry's " 'reckless disregard for the health and safety of the consuming public' ").
65. There are some early signs that the Clinton administration will be a pro-consumer
era. For example, the President reappointed FDA Commissioner David Kessler, who had ag-
gressively enforced the food and drug laws during his previous two years in the office. David
Brown & Boyce Rensberger, Kessler Asked To Remain as Head of FDA; Healy Announces Resignation
at NIH, WASH. PosT, Feb. 27, 1993, at Al. The Clinton-appointed Secretary of Transporta-
tion proposed a fiscal 1994 budget increase for the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration of 14%. Pena Proposes FY 1994 Budget for NHTSA; 14 Percent Increase Means $30.7
Million, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 353, 353 (Apr. 12, 1993). The Department of
Transportation asked General Motors to recall 4.7 million pick-up trucks. Doron P. Levin,
Battle over G.M. 's Pickup Could Take Years To Settle, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 1993, at D1.
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D. A Limited Regulatory Compliance Defense
1. Closely regulated products
Proponents of a narrow compliance defense for FDA- and FAA-
regulated products argue that the defense does not contain the
weaknesses of an across-the-board regulatory compliance defense 66
and is justified for two reasons. First, concerns about regulatory
system adequacy should not exist. The products in question must
be approved by a regulatory agency before they can be marketed
and therefore are subject to far greater regulatory scrutiny than
other products. 67 Second, these products are special because of
their value to society. They deserve protection from tort doctrines
such as punitive damages that might deter their production and de-
velopment. 68 In sum, more is at stake with these products and more
should be done to safeguard them.
The other side of this argument, of course, is that more is also at
stake for the public if these products are not adequately controlled.
While admittedly these products are socially useful, they also pose
some of the greatest risks to human beings. Consider, for example,
the widespread injuries that thousands of women suffered as a con-
sequence of using the Dalkon Shield6 9 or DES, 70 to name but two
66. See S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 60 (commenting that S. 640 was portrayed by its
proponents as less "draconian" than earlier product liability bills in terms of effects on con-
sumers); cf. S. 640, supra note 2, § 303 (limiting recovery of punitive damages only and provid-
ing exceptions where manufacturers withheld or misrepresented information or where they
made illegal payments to FDA officials).
67. See S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 38 (asserting that because government expends
many resources in conducting reviews of drug and aircraft products' safety and risks, their
extensive regulation makes them inappropriate subjects of punitive damages claims).
68. See S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 38 (suggesting that "imposing tort liability on
top of safety regulation can result in overdeterrence of socially desirable products and
activities").
69. See MICHAEL RUSTAD, THE ROSCOE POUND FOUNDATION, DEMYSTIFYING PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A SURVEY OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF TRIAL VERDICTS
8 (1991) (citing Dalkon Shield as clear example of inadequate testing). The Dalkon Shield,
which had not been tested adequately but was aggressively marketed, was implanted in more
than two million women. Id. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, the Dalkon Shield cases
alone accounted for more than 10%7 of the increase in product liability case filings in federal
courts. SeeJudith P. Swazey, Prescription Drug Safety and Product Liability, in THE LIABILITY MAZE,
supra note 42, at 295 (noting that according to General Accounting Office Dalkon Shield liti-
gation was responsible for 12% of growth in federal product liability filings from 1974-1985).
70. See RUSSELL MOKHIBER, CORPORATE CRIME AND VIOLENCE: BIG BUSINESS POWER AND
THE ABUSE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST 179 (1988) (stating that between 1941 and 1971, between
500,000 and 2 million women took DES to prevent miscarriages). Hundreds of lawsuits with
thousands of named plaintiffs have been filed around the country against the manufacturers of
DES. Sales of the drug were halted by the FDA in 1971 when it was discovered that a rare
vaginal cancer was afflicting daughters of mothers who took DES during their pregnancies.
See Rore Sherman, New DES Front, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 12, 1990, at 26 (discussing history of DES
liability). Subsequently, it was discovered that DES sons also suffered adverse consequences.
See J.T. Johnson & Mark Dowie, Revenge of a DES Son, MOTHER JONES, Feb./Mar. 1983, at 31
(describing various genital abnormalities suffered by men exposed to DES as fetuses).
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prescription products. Indeed, the level of potential risk from such
products is one of the reasons they are so closely regulated. 71
In addition, history does not suggest that the regulatory systems
governing these products have been so effective in protecting the
public that the tort system, with its punitive damage component, has
been rendered unnecessary as an incentive for product safety. The
recent bribery scandal at the FDA already has been discussed. 72
Consider also the following examples of drugs and devices that
passed muster under the FDA's comprehensive regulatory schemes
and were marketed to the public.
1. ORAFLEX, an arthritis drug, was approved by the FDA in the
first year of the Reagan administration, even though the agency had
refused to approve the drug two years earlier.73 The drug's manu-
facturer, Eli Lilly, aggressively promoted Oraflex with a $12 million
marketing campaign. 74 It was later learned that Eli Lilly had knowl-
edge of but failed to report a number of overseas deaths related to
the drug.75 Before Oraflex was withdrawn from the U.S. market,
estimates indicated that the drug had caused fifty deaths in this
country. 76 Ultimately, Eli Lilly pleaded guilty to statutory violations
and was assessed a fine of $25,000. 77 The company's chief medical
officer was fined $15,000.78
2. ORCOLON, a gel used in eye surgery, was approved by the FDA
despite misgivings by the lead FDA reviewer and evidence that the
product could cause elevated eye pressure.79 After thirty-three pa-
tients had to undergo additional eye surgery to save their eyes be-
71. See Speedier Drugs, ECONOMiST, Dec. 7, 1991, at 16 (discussing fear of deregulation of
drugs).
72. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (describing FDA scandal involving brib-
ery by generic drug companies in late 1980s).
73. See Schwartz, Federal Safety Regulations, supra note 43, at 1148-49 n. 124 (stating that
Oraflex received approval from FDA only two years after being rejected); see also S. RFp. No.
215, supra note 6, at 82 (noting FDA's lack of diligence in reviewing information available to it
prior to approving Oraflex); CLAYBROOK, supra note 54, at 48-50 (describing Oraflex and cir-
cumstances surrounding its approval by FDA).
74. See MOKHIBER, supra note 70, at 329-30 (describing Eli Lilly's promotional barrage,
which included letters to doctors and newspaper, radio, and television advertisements).
75. See MOKHIBER, supra note 70, at 329-38 (stating that Eli Lilly had knowledge of nu-
merous fatalities and other adverse reactions that it did not share with enforcement officials;
detailing Justice Department report on case wherein prosecutors revealed that Eli Lilly knew
of at least 23 deaths and dozens of serious adverse reactions caused by Oraflex early in first
two months of 1982 and still began sale of drug in United States in spring of that year).
76. CLAYBROOK, supra note 54, at 50.
77. MOKHIBER, supra note 70, at 337.
78. MOKHIBER, supra note 70, at 337.
79. See Bruce Ingersoll, Amid Lax Regulation, Medical Devices Flood a Vulnerable Market, WALL
ST.J., Mar. 24, 1992, at A6 (noting that Orcolon was approved despite fact that FDA officials
were aware of findings that two people required surgery to prevent total blindness after using
Orcolon, and lead reviewer had "deep misgivings about the product").
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cause of Orcolon, the product was withdrawn from the market.80
3. BREAST IMPLANTS were among the 140 categories of high-risk
devices whose safety was supposed to be established by manufactur-
ers under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.81 Since 1976,
however, the FDA has asked manufacturers of only eight device cat-
egories to prove the safety of their products.8 2 Not until 1991 did
the FDA request test data on silicone breast implants,8 3 despite the
facts that serious questions regarding their safety had been raised
decades earlier8 4 and that the FDA had received some 5000 com-
plaints about them since 1983.85 Recently, a number of successful
lawsuits against breast implant manufacturers has resulted in puni-
tive damages awards.
86
4. ASPIRIN LABELING pertaining to Reye's Syndrome risks was
delayed for years by the FDA and the Office of Management and
Budget under the Reagan administration. 7 This delay persisted de-
spite widespread agreement in the medical and scientific communi-
ties about the serious risks to children who take aspirin. 88
5. MERrrAL, an antidepressant, was approved by the FDA despite
information it had in its files about allergic reactions to the drug.8 9
The manufacturer also withheld information about some thirty
deaths associated with the drug's use.90
6. COPPER 7 IUD was approved by the FDA and marketed to wo-
men who were first-time mothers, despite the manufacturer's knowl-
80. Id at Al.
81. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (1988) (providing that manufacturers of high-risk devices intro-
duced before 1976, including breast implants, must prove safety of devices prior to devices'
marketing).
82. Ingersoll, supra note 79, at A6.
83. Ingersoll, supra note 79, at A6.
84. Ingersoll, supra note 79, at A6.
85. See Sandy Rovner, Implant Safety: Who's Right?, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1991,
(Healthtalk) at 212 (reporting that FDA had received 5000 complaints concerning silicone
breast implants from 1983-1991).
86. See Tamar Lewin, As Silicone Issue Grows, Women Take Agony and Anger to Court, N.Y.
TiMES,Jan. 19, 1992, at Al, A18 (stating that three multimillion-dollarjury awards have been
made in past year to women suffering from breast implant complications).
87. See Schwartz, Product Safety Agenda, supra note 55, at 1363-64 (describing four-year
delay in promulgation of aspirin labeling precipitated by OMB and Reagan administration
pressure).
88. See Schwartz, Product Safety Agenda, supra note 55, at 1363-64 (describing OMB's inter-
vention in promulgation of aspirin labeling).
89. See Schwartz, Federal Safety Regulations, supra note 43, at 1148 n.123 (describing how
FDA ignored medical reports of severe allergic reactions to Merital).
90. Schwartz, Federal Safety Regulations, supra note 43, at 1148 n.123; see REPORT OF THE
HUMAN RESOURCES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SUBCOMM., GOV'T OPERATIONS
Comm., FDA's REGULATION OF THE NEW DRUG MERITAL, H.R. Doc. No. 206, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 47 (1987) (revealing that subcommittee investigation found that Merital's manufacturer
failed to report to FDA prior to approval that it knew of at least 30 deaths associated with
drug).
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edge that the IUD posed special risks to this particular category of
women. 91 A jury awarded significant compensatory and punitive
damages to a woman in this category who had been injured by the
Copper 7 IUD. 9
2
7. TAMPON LABELING for toxic shock syndrome was delayed some
twenty months because the FDA chose to rely first on voluntary
standards by the industry (although the standards were not univer-
sally adopted) instead of issuing a rule requiring the labeling. 93
8. SELACRYN, a medication for high blood pressure, was heavily
promoted by its manufacturer at the same time the manufacturer
withheld information from the FDA about serious adverse effects
from the drug.94 When the information was reported, it was "bur-
ied in a massive and routine manuscript" and not immediately dis-
covered by FDA officials. 95 In the eight months the product was on
the market, it caused sixty deaths and 513 cases of liver damage. 96
In the end, the FDA recommended that felony charges be brought
against the manufacturer, but the Justice Department chose to bring
misdemeanor charges. 97 As a result, the company was fined only
91. See S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 83 n.95 (positing that strong evidence existed
that Copper 7 IUD's manufacturer had knowledge that device posed dangers for women who
had not previously had children); see also Kociemba v. G.P. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517,
1537 (D. Minn. 1989) (finding that evidence presented by plaintiff would have led jury to
conclude that "defendant knowingly placed millions of American women, especially [women
who have not had children], at risk of serious infection, loss of fertility, and surgery for re-
moval of organs").
92. See Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1535-38 (denying motion for new trial in case awarding
millions in punitive damages). The case was settled without appeal. S. REP. No. 215, supra
note 6, at 78.
93. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., lST SESS., MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION: THE FDA's
NEGLECTED CHILD 48-50 (Comm. Print 1983) (discussing history of toxic shock syndrome
warning requirements for tampon manufacturers). The House Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations reviewed the voluntary labelings adopted by tampon manufacturers and
found them to be unsatisfactory. Id. at 49. The subcommittee found that some manufacturers
discontinued the warnings over time while others misrepresented facts regarding the inci-
dence of risk. Id
94. See MOEHIBER, supra note 70, at 392-99 (discussing history of Selacryn). In April of
1979 the FDA allowed Selacryn's manufacturer, Smithkline, to market the drug. Id. at 395.
The FDA required Smithkline to include a warning label explaining that adverse reactions had
been reported. Id. The label, however, also stated that no causal relationship had been estab-
lished between the drug and the reported adverse reactions. Id. Almost immediately after
Selacryn's debut, the company received numerous reports of adverse reactions, including at
least 12 cases of severe liver damage. Id. at 396. Yet, despite being required by law to report
known adverse reactions to the FDA within 15 days of notification, the company failed to
inform the FDA for more than three months. Id.
95. See MOKHIBER, supra note 70, at 396 (explaining that while FDA usually handles unex-
pected side-effect cases expeditiously, fact that reports were buried in 2500-page routine fil-
ing further delayed drug-review process).
96. MOKHIBER, supra note 70, at 397.
97. See Schwartz, Federal Safety Regulations, supra note 43, at 1149 n. 126 (citing Selacryn as
another example of manufacturer's failure to disclose vital information to governmental
agency).
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$100,000, and three executives received probation and sentences of
community service.98
9. OPREN, an arthritis drug, was known by its manufacturer, Eli
Lilly, to have been associated with more than seventy deaths in Brit-
ain before it was withdrawn from the market in the early 1980s. 99 In
addition, Eli Lilly had "grossly understated" problems with the drug
by failing to report to the FDA a large number of the adverse reac-
tions caused by the drug and reported to the company by doctors
around the country.' 00
10. MER/29, a blood-cholesterol reducing agent, was the subject
of perhaps the "most shocking case of fraud" in drug safety testing
history.' 0 ' Richardson-Merrell, MER/29's manufacturer, commit-
ted innumerable abuses while testing the product by fabricating
data and concealing adverse effects that were discovered in animal
and human testing of the drug.10 2 Eventually, the Government filed
criminal charges against Richardson-Merrell that resulted in fines of
$80,000 against four employees, including the company's presi-
dent. 03 In addition, several individual defendants were sentenced
to probation. 0 4 Subsequently, some 1500 civil suits were filed,' 0 5
resulting in costs to the defendant companies of approximately
$200 million.', In one of these cases, the court treated the FDA's
approval of the drug as conclusive evidence of adequate safety
measures and dismissed the case.' 07 Punitive damages were
98. See MOKHIBER, supra note 70, at 398 (discussing disposition of suit after company
plead guilty to charges of failure to report drug's side effects in timely manner).
99. See JOHN BRArrHwArrE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 56
(1984) (discussing cases where dangerous effects of drugs were concealed and misrepresented
by drug companies).
100. See id. (noting that list of side effects in initial FDA application for Opren was sub-
stantially different from list included in final submission).
101. See id at 60 (noting that soon after MER/29 was distributed in marketplace, people
began reporting side effects such as "baldness, skin damage, changes in the reproductive or-
gans and blood, and serious eye damage").
102. See id. at 60-64 (detailing specific instances of tampering with animal and human lab-
oratory test results).
103. See RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 7 (finding that punitive damages are not awarded in
absence of "aggravated misconduct;" classifying fraud and misrepresentation that occurred in
testing and marketing of MER/29 as "fraudulent-type affirmative misconduct" sufficient to
constitute "aggravated misconduct").
104. BRArrawArrE, supra note 99, at 64 (noting that three corporate defendants received
six months probation). The market for MER/29 was considered to be worth billions of dol-
lars, and thus the risk of $80,000 in fines was well worth taking. See id. at 64 (noting that
MER/29 market was estimated at $4.25 billion annually).
105. See RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 7 (discussing history of MER/29 litigation).
106. See BRArrHwAITE, supra note 99, at 64 (noting that most suits regarding MER/29 were
settled out of court).
107. See Lewis v. Baker, 413 P.2d 400, 404 (Or. 1966) (stating that plaintiff is barred from
recovery for breach of warranty against seller in absence of proof that drug contained impuri-
ties or that labeling was inadequate), overruled by McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528
P.2d 522, 524 (Or. 1974). In expressly overruling the decision in Lewis, the court in McEwen
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awarded to plaintiffs in only three cases, however.108
11. DALKON SHIELD, an intrauterine device, was inadequately
tested yet aggressively marketed for many years by A.H. Robins.' 0 9
The device was finally recalled, but not before causing hundreds of
injuries such as ectopic pregnancies, uterine perforations, and steril-
ity. 110 None of these injuries was reported to the FDA."I I In the
product liability litigation that followed, only about fifty Dalkon
Shield cases were tried, with approximately half of the plaintiffs win-
ning and half of those being awarded punitive damages. 12 Few ac-
tually received their punitive awards, however, because A.H. Robins
subsequently filed for reorganization under chapter 11 of the bank-
ruptcy laws.' 
1 3
2. Exceptions for fraud and bribery under Senate bill 640
While the above cases certainly raise concerns about any compli-
ance defense for FDA-approved products, it also appears that most
of the cases would fall outside the compliance provisions of Senate
bill 640. Many of these cases involved misrepresentations to or
withholdings of information from the FDA, both of which are con-
duct that is specifically not protected by Senate bill 640. In addi-
tion, products such as tampons, the Dalkon Shield, and breast
was unconvinced that mere compliance with FDA warning requirements absolved this manu-
facturer from liability. McEwen, 528 P.2d at 534. The court reasoned that where the FDA
imposed minimum warning requirements, but the manufacturer knew or had reason to know
of " 'greater dangers not included in the warning,' " the manufacturer could be liable for
breach of the duty to warn. See id. (quoting Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661
(Cal. 1973)).
108. RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 7. A famous case that first raised concern about the possi-
bility of multiple punitive damages awards in such circumstances was Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). In Roginsky, the plaintiff sought to recover com-
pensatory and punitive damages, claiming that the defendant manufacturer's blood choles-
terol-reducing drug, MER/29, caused the plaintiff to develop cataracts. Roginsky, 378 F.2d at
834. In denying judgment as to punitive damages, the court held that the plaintiff had not
"clearly established" the quality of conduct necessary to warrant punitive damages. Id. at 850.
The court stated:
It would be hard to think of a situation more appropriate for invoking (the clear and
convincing] standard than where the manufacturer of a new drug honestly believed
to assist in prolonging human life is faced with claims for penalties by hundreds of
plaintiffs running into millions of dollars, in addition to many millions more for dam-
ages sustained.
Id. at 851.
109. See RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 8-9 (characterizing Dalkon Shield cases as "inadequate
testing" cases and noting that inadequate testing was central in 12% (44) of cases studied).
110. See BRarrniwArm, supra note 99, at 258 (discussing Dalkon Shield in context of prac-
tice of pharmaceutical dumping in developing countries).
111. BRArrHwArrE, supra note 99, at 253. At that time, A.H. Robins, the Dalkon Shield's
manufacturer, was not required to report adverse reactions to the FDA. Id.
112. See RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 8-9 (noting that despite seemingly meritorious claims,
Dalkon Shield victims were not necessarily awarded punitive damages).
113. RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 8-9.
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implants would not have been governed by Senate bill 640's regula-
tory compliance provision because at the time they were marketed,
FDA approval was not required. 114 Thus, insofar as the above prod-
ucts and circumstances are concerned, Senate bill 640's compliance
defense would not apply and punitive damages would be available.
Of course, it should be noted that the mere availability of punitive
damages in such cases does not mean they are sought or awarded.
Even in the cases of egregious manufacturer conduct described
above, few punitive damages awards were ever made or paid under
the common law. 15
Indeed, it is not at all clear that the outcome of any past cases
involving drugs, devices, or aircraft would be changed by the com-
pliance provisions of Senate bill 640. The Senate report on the bill
identified no cases that would be changed by the new provision. 116
In fact, with one exception, the report identified no punitive dam-
ages awards involving drugs, devices, or aircraft that it viewed as
wrongly decided. The one exception was a Kansas case in which a
jury awarded $8 million in punitive damages against a vaccine man-
ufacturer. 117 The case, however, was reversed on appeal." 8
In the final analysis, the fraud and bribery exceptions of Senate
bill 640 go a long way toward assuring that cases of serious miscon-
duct would remain subject to punitive damages awards. One might
ask, then, why the opponents of Senate bill 640 should be con-
cerned about this regulatory compliance provision. The answer, in
part, is that there would still be some cases, although not many,
where punitive awards now available under the common law would
not be allowed under Senate bill 640. In his exhaustive study of
punitive damages, Professor Michael Rustad identified several cases
that appeared to warrant punitive damages despite regulatory com-
pliance and the absence of fraud on the part of the manufacturer. 19
114. See S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 55 n.197 (specifying that Dalkon Shield would
not have been protected from punitive damages under Senate bill 640, but failing to mention
whether breast implants were subject to provision).
115. See supra notes 86, 108, 112 and accompanying text (discussing rarity of punitive
damages awards).
116. See S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 33-39 (failing to provide cases demonstrating
potential impact of compliance provision).
117. See S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 34, 54 n.174 (questioning lack ofjudicial defer-
ence to agency determinations concerning comprehensively regulated industries).
118. SeeJohnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1326 (Kan. 1986) (determin-
ing that no colorable legal theory existed upon which defendant could be liable). At the trial
level, the jury awarded $2 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive dam-
ages. Id. at 1325. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed, finding that the lower
court erred in not granting a directed verdict for the defendant vaccine manufacturer. Id at
1326.
119. See RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 48 (discussing implications of punitive damages re-
form). One case involved a defectively designed intraocular lens. Id. The manufacturer dis-
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Still, if this type of case is rare, as Rustad acknowledges,1 20 it might
not, alone, be a sufficient basis for rejecting a limited compliance
defense.
There are other concerns, however, about limiting the availability
of punitive damages in cases of drugs, devices, and aircraft. One
concern is that such a limitation would remove an important incen-
tive for product safety. Although it is questioned whether punitive
damages act as such an incentive, 121 there should be little dispute
that the economic consequences of punitive damages are far more
serious to corporations than the consequences of civil, or even crim-
inal, penalties.1 22 While on a cost-benefit basis the risk of a civil fine
might be well worth taking, the same can seldom be said of the risk
of uncertain, albeit remote, punitive damages.
Another concern about limiting the availability of punitive dam-
ages in cases of drugs, devices, and aircraft is that such limitations
would have an adverse effect on plaintiffs' ability to obtain settle-
ments, which account for ninety percent of all tort case resolu-
tions.' 23 This would be especially true in serious injury cases where
it is widely acknowledged that plaintiffs are seldom fully compen-
sated for their injuries. 124 The mere availability of punitive dam-
covered through its own studies that the lenses exposed patients to a risk of sight-threatening
injury that was three to five times higher than acceptable levels. Id. The FDA knew of these
results but failed to order a recall of the lenses. Id. A second example involved a V-tail plane
that had been approved by the FAA despite its involvement in some 500 deaths with no regu-
latory response by the Agency. Id. at 49 n. 11.
120. See RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 48 (noting that almost every drug case studied involved
elements of fraudulent activity by manufacturer). Professor Rustad notes that, because fraud-
ulent activity is so pervasive in these drug cases, Senate bill 640's safe harbor provisions will
have "little impact" on curtailing punitive damages awards. Id.
121. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 69 (asserting that punitive damages
are not effective deterrent because punishments are not enforced until years after conduct
occurs). The report contends that punitive damages' deterrent effect could be obtained
through civil fines. Id. at 69 n.16. But see infra note 122 and accompanying text (contrasting
statutory liability system with tort liability system).
122. Civil or criminal fines seldom come close to the size of typical tort and punitive dam-
ages awards. Consider the fine of $25,000 imposed on Eli Lilly, the manufacturer of Oraflex.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing Oraflex case). A wrongful death action
involving the drug resulted in a jury verdict of $6 million. MOXHIBER, supra note 70, at 337.
Similarly, in the case of MER/29, the criminal fines were less than $100,000, but the tort suits
cost the companies approximately $200 million. See Schwartz, Federal Safety Regulations, supra
note 43, at 1138 n.68 (noting "enormous discrepancy between tort liability awards and statu-
tory fines" and concluding that deterrent effect of product liability system is much stronger
than that of regulatory system).
123. See Patricia M. Danzon, The Medical Malpractice System: Facts and Reforms, in ThE EF-
FECTS OF LrTIGATION ON HEALTH CARE COSTS 28, 30 (Mary Ann Baily & Warren I. Cikins eds.,
1985) (noting high incidence of pretrial settlement in refuting assertion that tort system is
"erratic lottery").
124. See MichaelJ. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1287, 1216-20 (1992) (concluding that while
"modest losses are . . . overcompensated . . . the larger the loss suffered, the more pro-
nounced the undercompensation"; further stating that pattern "is so well replicated that it
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ages, even if they are unlikely to be awarded, might give plaintiffs
additional clout and thereby level the playing field somewhat in ne-
gotiating settlements in such cases. 125 Indeed, proponents of this
reform are quite concerned about the intangible role of punitive
damages in settlements,1 26 which suggests that the damages are at
least perceived as having some effect on the process. If punitive
damages are unavailable from the outset, absent fraud or bribery, as
would be the case under Senate bill 640, it certainly would be more
difficult for plaintiffs to negotiate favorable settlements in serious
injury cases.
Finally, opponents of Senate bill 640 should be concerned about
the difficulty of framing a compliance provision narrow enough to
exclude all the types of misconduct that should be exempted from
its coverage. As noted earlier, the regulatory compliance provisions
of Senate bill 640 had to be updated to address a recent example of
wrongdoing: bribery at the FDA.1 27 While the new version of the
compliance defense dealt specifically with the FDA situation, it
failed to make any provision for bribery involving aircraft manufac-
turers or the FAA. Thus, as drafted, Senate bill 640 would seem-
ingly protect from a punitive damages award an aircraft
manufacturer that engaged in bribery. Obviously, this is not the
intent of the drafters, 128 but it does demonstrate the inherent diffi-
culty in trying to frame a statutory solution that anticipates all the
qualifies as one of the major empirical phenomenon of tort litigation"); see also S. REP. No.
215, supra note 6, at 5 (noting that minor losses are overcompensated and major losses are
undercompensated).
125. See RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 6 (discussing responses of plaintiffs' attorneys to ques-
tionnaire and finding that plaintiffs' attorneys generally view threat of punitive damages as
having positive effect on settlement negotiations). Interestingly, not all plaintiffs' attorneys
believe that punitive damages have a significant impact on settlements. See id. (noting one
plaintiffs' attorney from Utah who felt that threat of punitive damages played negligible role
in settlement negotiations). Generally, however, plaintiffs' attorneys feel that, although puni-
tive damages are never paid as part of settlements, they can help lawyers negotiate higher
settlements for actual damages on behalf of their clients. Id. To the extent punitive damages
do make a difference in settlement negotiations, plaintiffs' attorneys seem to believe that only
in cases where the manufacturer engaged in serious misconduct is there a genuine likelihood
that punitive damages would be awarded if the case went to trial. Id.
126. See S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 6 (arguing that uncertainty as to liability stan-
dards regarding punitive damages claims inhibits manufacturers' ability to negotiate effec-
tively). The report seemingly maintained that punitive damages claims actually discourage
settlements, but also implied that a different effect obtains if a claim is made in a " 'situation
[that] truly calls for punitive damages.'" Id. at 34 (quoting Professor Aaron D. Twerski, A
Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U.
MICH.J.L. REF. 575, 612 (1985)); see also Twerski, supra, at 612 (claiming that threat of puni-
tive damages "sabotages" settlement negotiations).
127. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing reason for including bribery
exception in Senate bill 640's proposed ban on punitive damages).
128. In S. 687, supra note 6, § 203(c)(2)(B), bribery of FAA officials was included in the
conduct that was not protected from punitive damage awards.
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circumstances under which punitive damages should or should not
be allowed.
Another difficulty emerges in interpreting Senate bill 640's fraud
exceptions. For example, would the compliance defense exceptions
apply to cases like the Selacryn case, where the manufacturer argua-
bly informed the FDA of the problems with its drug but in such a
manner that it did not catch the attention of FDA officials? 129 No
doubt there would be a myriad of such cases that would need to be
decided under the statute's constraints. In the end, these cases are
best left to the tort system where a judge or jury can assess the con-
duct of the defendant in light of all the circumstances of the case. '
3 0
Having addressed the question of why Senate bill 640 opponents
should be concerned about a provision that would have a limited
impact on the common law, this Article next considers why Senate
bill 640 proponents believe the provision is so important. The an-
swer, at least in part, is found in proponents' deep-seated concerns
about punitive damages awards and their desire to find ways of lim-
iting such awards. If, as the proponents claim, punitive damages
awards are out of control, then a limited regulatory compliance de-
fense might still be justified. The next Part examines the claims
about punitive damages as a justification for the proposed defense.
III. PUNITIVE DAM'AGES LIMITS
A. Critics of Punitive Damages
The perception that punitive damages are out of control has been
growing in recent years.'13 A Justice Department study produced
during the Reagan administration focused on the issue and found
there had been an "explosion in damage awards" for noneconomic
losses, i.e., pain and suffering and punitive damages.' 3 2 The study
129. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing history of Selacryn case).
130. Certainly the record of punitive damages in this country indicates that the judicial
system is capable of doing a good job with respect to punitive damages awards. See infra notes
149-55 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Rustad's comprehensive study of all
product liability cases awarding punitive damages from 1965 to 1990).
131. See ALI, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILrrv, supra note 34, at 232 (discussing public's per-
ception of punitive damages awards). The study states:
The topic [of punitive damages] has surfaced in the public and political arena as
people have become aware of occasionally huge jury verdicts-such as the $125 mil-
lion award against Ford Motor Company in the Pinto case and the $3 billion award
against Texaco arising out of the Pennzoil litigation.
Id. (citations omitted). The American Law Institute posits that news stories have furthered
the impression that punitive damages in tort cases are being awarded more often and in
greater amounts than in previous years. Id.
132. See ATrORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 42 (claiming that increase in puni-
tive damages awards during 1980s exceeded inflation rate over same period).
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concluded that awards had "soared in the United States without any
apparent justification"' 133 and recommended a drastic cap on
noneconomic damages of $100,000 per case.134 More recently, and
more colorfully, former Vice President Quayle expressed the views
of the Bush administration on punitive damages:
Even a casual observer knows that, in the last several decades,
punitive damages have grown dramatically in both frequency and
size. What began as a sanction only for the most reprehensible
conduct has now become almost routine.... And as these awards
become more common, so do the instances of their arbitrary, even
freakish, application.13 5
Numerous critics of the tort and product liability system have fo-
cused on punitive damages as a central problem in the system.'
36
Demands for punitive damages are characterized as "routine"'
37
and awards are said to be "skyrocketing"' l38 and "epidemic."'' 39
The open-ended nature of the product liability system as a whole,
and by implication its indeterminate punitive damages component,
133. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 42.
134. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 68-69 (justifying cap on
noneconomic damages by arguing that only small percentage of all tort claims would be af-
fected and tort system would enjoy greater predictability overall). The study actually consid-
ered a total ban on punitive damages but rejected such a ban in favor of including punitive
damages with a $100,000 limit on noneconomic damages. See id. at 68 (arguing that "punitive
damages at best have a tenuous basis in tort law"). The study's suggestion is a radical propo-
sal compared to state tort reform proposals, none of which has included such low limits on
punitive damages. See Schwartz, Product Safety Agenda, supra note 55, at 1370-71 (discussing
Reagan administration's critical view of product liability law). Indeed, the lowest state caps on
punitive damages are at least twice the amount proposed by the Reagan administration. Id.
For example, a 1987 survey revealed that 20 states had enacted either an overall or a
noneconomic cap on medical malpractice claims. See Thomas W. Farrell, Virginia's Medical
Malpractice Cap and the Doctrine of Substantive Due Process, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 684, 688 (1988)
(discussing constitutionality of caps). The lowest cap was $250,000, and most caps exceeded
that amount. Id.
135. Vice President Dan Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, Address
Before the American Bar Association (Aug. 13, 1991), reprinted in NJ. L.J., Aug. 29, 1991, at
15, 25.
136. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAwsurr 285 (1991) (describing process of awarding punitive dam-
ages as "guesswork on stilts" because jury first guesses whether particular defendant harmed
particular plaintiff and then guesses how many similar wrongs have gone undetected).
137. See PETER HUBER, LIABILrry: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 127
(1988) (noting that punitive damages are "routine when the injury is serious and a wealthy
institution is numbered among the accused"); see also S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 34
(claiming that plaintiffs in product liability suits "routinely" seek punitive damages and that
such awards are generally large).
138. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing punitive damages
awards as "skyrocketing" and claiming that research and development of new products is
severely curtailed by threat of such awards).
139. See Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, The Plaintiff Attorneys' Great Honey Rush, FORBES,
Oct. 16, 1989, at 197, 199 (claiming that even compliance with governmental regulatory stan-
dards does not insulate manufacturers against punitive damages awards).
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is blamed for driving manufacturers out of business and depriving
society of valuable products. 140 As an example, one commentator
charges that punitive damages assessed against A.H. Robins, the
manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, "opened the floodgates for pu-
nitive attacks on . . .safer [contraceptive] substitutes" 14' and ulti-
mately caused other IUD manufacturers to withdraw from the
market. 142 If such views of the system are correct, then there may
indeed be grounds for regulatory compliance provisions to limit pu-
nitive damages.
B. Response to the Critics
Empirical studies, unlike the anecdotes used by reforn advocates
to show that the civil justice reform system is out of control,
143 sim-
ply do not support the conclusion that punitive damages awards are
arbitrarily or "freakishly" applied. In his exhaustive review of the
empirical studies in this area, Professor Michael Saks concluded that
views such as those of former Vice President Quayle, although
widely shared, have little basis in fact. 144 Citing studies by the
RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 145 Daniels and Martin,' 46 and
Landes and Posner,147 Saks found that the cumulative evidence
shows that punitive awards are infrequent and not exorbitant, espe-
140. See OLSON, supra note 136, at 283 (noting that companies have regularly been held
liable for punitive damages for actions expressly condoned by government regulations); see
also HUBER, supra note 137, at 155-71 (claiming that tort liability has negative effect on
innovation).
141. HUBER, supra note 137, at 128 (discussing Dalkon Shield cases' effect on punitive
damages awards against other contraceptive manufacturers).
142. See HUBER, supra note 137, at 162 (arguing that while Dalkon Shield unquestionably
warranted banning, subsequent substitute IUDs did not).
143. See Saks, supra note 124, at 1161 (criticizing use of anecdotal evidence in analyzing
litigation system). Saks states:
Anecdotes have a power to mislead us into thinking we know things that anecdotes
simply cannot teach us.... Anecdotes about undeserving plaintiffs are intriguing or
outrageous and have been repeated often in the media. Consequently people readily
believe that the category of undeserving plaintiffs dominates the system.
lit
144. See Saks, supra note 124, at 1254-56 n.401 (claiming that one Justice Department
report misread data by including in its analysis punitive damages awards in nontort suits and
by using mean values rather than median values in computing average awards).
145. See MARK A. PETERSON & GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE CIVILJURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS AND
VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960-1979 33-57 (1982) (comparing mean and median
awards in Cook County, Illinois from 1960-1979 and noting that median remained stable
during time period).
146. See Stephen Daniels &Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L.
REv. 1, 38 (1990) (analyzing punitive damages awards in selected counties and finding only
marginally significant upward trends in recent years).
147. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages, REG.,
Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 33, 35 (studying treatment of punitive damages awards on appeal and
finding that relatively few survive appeals).
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cially when post-trial adjustments are taken into account. 148
Perhaps the most thorough study ever undertaken of punitive
damages was completed recently by Professor Michael Rustad. 149
In his study, Rustad searched for all product liability cases in which
punitive damages were awarded during the quarter century from
1965 to 1990 and then studied in depth the 355 cases he uncovered.
The small number of cases in itself is noteworthy, given that in the
period from 1974 to 1990 there were 161,686 product liability cases
filed in the federal system alone,150 and a vastly larger number in
the state system. 15 1 The punitive damages awards are thus a very
small piece of the overall picture.
Another striking characteristic of the 355 awards was that more
than half of them were reversed or reduced after trial.'5 2 The re-
ductions most often occurred as a result of appeals or post-trial set-
tlements.153 A RAND study of post-trial reductions in awards also
showed that the larger the initial award, the greater the reduction
after trial.' 5 4 It is interesting to note that while the media typically
publicizes initial punitive awards, especially those that are extremely
high and seem questionable, it seldom reports on the frequent re-
ductions or eliminations of these awards that occur on appeal.' 55
148. See Saks, supra note 124, at 1254-62 (discussing various studies in supporting conclu-
sion that punitive damages awards are not "skyrocketing" as some tort reform advocates
claim).
149. See RUSTAD, supra note 69 (studying all product liability cases between 1965 and 1990
where punitive damages were awarded and concluding that empirical facts from study contra-
dict myths concerning punitive damages).
150. Saks, supra note 124, at 1259.
151. See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 6 (1986)
(estimating that federal filings account for only about 2%o of all civil action claims nationwide).
152. See RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 30-31 (stating that appellate reversal of punitive awards
was "common" and noting that appellate courts affirmed compensatory damages awards
more frequently than punitive damages awards).
153. See RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 30-32 (discussing post-trial disposition of cases involved
in study).
154. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND
THE STATISTICS 22-24 (1987) (noting that while reduction in jury awards for cases less than
$100,000 averaged 75%, reduction injury awards over $1 million averaged almost 40%).
The study noted, however, that product liability suits and cases involving deep-pocket defend-
ants resulted in smaller reductions. Id.
155. See RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 31 (citing as example media reporting $75 million puni-
tive award in Bendectin case but failing to report that award was eliminated on appeal); see also
ALI, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 34, at 232-35 (discussing legitimacy of punitive
damages awards). The ALI report notes:
News stories have fueled a general impression that punitive awards are now being
rendered in far more tort cases and in far greater amounts....
[M]ore systematic surveys [of punitive damages, however,] provide a helpful per-
spective on the somewhat distorted perception one gets from reading about only the
largest and most questionable punitive awards.
ALl, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 34, at 232, 235.
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C. Punitive Awards in Drug, Device, and Aircraft Cases
To conclude that there is no overall problem with punitive
awards, of course, is not to eliminate the possibility that there is a
problem in cases involving drugs, devices, and aircraft. As noted
earlier, however, the Senate committee reporting on Senate bill 640
identified no cases, except the Kansas vaccine case that was later
overturned, in which a punitive award had been improper or
excessive.
156
According to Rustad's study, there have been fifty-three punitive
damages awards involving medical products in the last twenty-five
years. 157 Many of these cases involved breast implants, the Dalkon
Shield, MER/29, and Oraflex. 158 Indeed, probably twenty percent
of the medical product cases involved the Dalkon Shield alone. 159
No improper awards among these fifty-three, except in the Kansas
case, were identified by the Senate committee, however. While, as
noted earlier, one prominent critic of the current tort system criti-
cized punitive damages claims in the Dalkon Shield cases because
they encouraged similar claims against other contraceptive mak-
ers, 160 the Senate committee avoided any such implication by point-
ing out that the Dalkon Shield would not have been protected from
punitive damages under Senate bill 640.161 In short, the Senate
committee failed to make a case against specific punitive damages
awards.
The committee, however, did provide a wide-ranging critique of
the entire product liability system and the burdens it places on pro-
ductivity, innovation, and U.S. competitiveness. 162 The committee
156. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (discussing effect that compliance pro-
visions of Senate bill 640 would have had on past product liability cases had provisions been
in operation at time cases were decided).
157. See RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 26 (listing number of punitive damages awards in differ-
ent product categories). The medical products category included drugs, breast implants, hos-
pital equipment, contraceptives, and prosthetic devices. Id.
158. See supra notes 73-78, 83-86, 101-13 and accompanying text (discussing history of
various product liability cases).
159. See RUSTAD, supra note 69, at 8 (discussing history of Dalkon Shield cases). Fewer
plaintiffs actually received punitive awards in the Dalkon Shield litigations, of course, due to
the chapter 11 proceedings initiated by A.H. Robins, the Shield's manufacturer. Id. at 8-9.
160. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (noting Peter Huber's contention that
withdrawal of Dalkon Shield from market led to increase in claims filed against other IUD
manufacturers and had residual effect of forcing those manufacturers out of market).
161. S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 55 n.197. The report states:
[The regulatory compliance provision of Senate bill 640] does not apply to medical
devices that were never subsject [sic] to pre-market approval by the FDA, such as the
interuterine device known as the Dalkon Shield, which was taken off the market
before FDA pre-market regulation of medical devices began in 1976.
Id.
162. See S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 7-10 (claiming that cost of supporting product
liability system places tremendous burden on nation's economy).
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identified various ways in which the system would adversely affect
the three industries that would benefit from the regulatory compli-
ance defense: the pharmaceutical, medical device, and aircraft in-
dustries. 163 The committee gave as an example of overdeterrence in
the pharmaceutical industry the decision of two of the three diph-
theria-tetanus-pertussis (DPT) vaccine manufacturers to stop pro-
ducing the vaccine because of high product liability costs. 16 While
this was a legitimate concern some years ago, it has been recognized
and addressed in an equitable manner by the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. 6 5 Indeed, the adverse ef-
fects of the product liability system in this case had the positive ef-
fect of motivating industry, consumers, and the medical profession
to fashion legislation that would be fair to all interested parties.
66
With respect to the aircraft industry, the committee pointed to the
declining fortunes of the general aviation industry, largely attribut-
ing them to the liability system. 16 7 The fact that the fortunes of the
pharmaceutical industry have been soaring,' 68 despite the product
liability system, was not mentioned by the committee.
The committee did not specifically tie the adverse effects on the
industries to punitive damages. Instead, the charges were more
generally aimed at the product liability system as a whole. As is
often the case in the debate over product liability reform, however,
the link between the product liability system and its adverse effects
on industry, such as an entire industry's poor economic health, is
seldom clearly established. The information needed to assess the
linkage is in the hands of industry groups, and they do not want to
divulge it for public scrutiny. Even the committee's own source for
many of its claims about the system, The Liability Maze, acknowledges
163. See S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 8 (stating that system adversely affects productiv-
ity by forcing diversion of resources such as management time away from productivity efforts).
164. See S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 8 (noting that discontinuation of DPT production
led to supply shortage of vaccine).
165. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -33 (1988). The Act is designed to compensate victims
of vaccine-related injuries or deaths. Id. Congress passed the law in response to a rise in
liability claims against vaccine manufacturers for childhood vaccine injuries. See Schwartz,
Product Liability Reform, supra note 44, at 317 (discussing nature and purpose of Act). The Act's
cap on damages and prohibition on punitive awards is an attempt to induce the reentry of
manufacturers into the vaccine market and to halt the spiraling costs of vaccines. Id.
166. See Schwartz, Product Liability Reform, supra note 44, at 317 (discussing trends in state
and federal tort reform legislation).
167. See S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 8 (noting that between 1979 and 1989, sales in
general aviation industry dropped by more than 90%o and that in 1985, despite sound industry
safety records, "insurance premiums averaged $70,000 per airplane").
168. See Wasted Health Care Dollars, CONSUMER REP., July 1992, at 435, 445 (noting that
pharmaceutical industry is one of "nation's most profitable industrial sectors .. .with an
average profit margin of 157"). Over the last decade, investors in pharmaceutical companies
have enjoyed an average return each year of 25%o. Id.
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the lack of hard data. 169 According to one contributing author in
that volume, the prospects that manufacturers will ever supply bet-
ter information are dim. The author states, "For prescription drugs
and other products, the publicly extant information is fragmentary
and inconclusive at best, because of the general unwillingness of
companies to document their claims about a product liability crisis
by providing data about the actual effects of litigation."'170
The positive impacts of the product liability system on safety are
even less likely to be supplied by industry. As the editors of The
Liability Maze themselves observe, "Even if liability does encourage
safer practices, no obstetrician or car company will wish to spend
much time advertising the connection."'' 71 Thus, other than by use
of anecdotal cases, 172 it is almost impossible to verify the adverse
effects, such as overdeterrence, that are claimed by the critics of the
product liability system. Even the specific cases offered as examples
of those effects often reveal other concerns that may have been re-
sponsible for deterring the marketing of the product.' 7-1
The one aspect of the product liability system for which there is
very good empirical data is the extent to which punitive damages are
awarded and paid.' 74 Punitive damages have been shown to be a
very small piece of the overall tort system, yet they receive enor-
mous attention1 75 and apparently strike great fear in the business
community. 176 It is not entirely clear why this is so. Perhaps the
fear arises in response to the disproportionate media attention paid
169. See Swazey, supra note 69, at 295-96 (discussing trends in product liability concerning
prescription drugs).
170. Swazey, supra note 69, at 295-96.
171. See Huber & Litan, supra note 42, at 11 ("To concede positive safety effects resulting
from liability is to invite more liability.").
172. See Saks, supra note 124, at 1159 (criticizing use of anecdotal evidence in analyzing
tort litigation system by arguing that "[a]necdotes do not permit one to determine either the
frequency of the occurrence of something or its causes or effects"). Saks states:
The use of anecdotal evidence has been unusually popular in discussions about the
nature of the litigation system....
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence is heavily discounted in most fields, and for a
perfectly good reason: such evidence permits only the loosest and weakest infer-
ences about matters a field is trying to understand.
Id.
173. See S. REP. No. 215, supra note 6, at 77-80 (minority views of Senators Hollings and
Gore) (addressing safety problems associated with six different products that proponents of
Senate bill 640 claim were "unfairly" forced off market because of product liability system).
174. See supra notes 143-55 and accompanying text (discussing empirical studies on puni-
tive damages awards in product liability cases).
175. See supra notes 135, 155 and accompanying text (discussing attention paid by Bush
administration and media to punitive damages issue).
176. See Saks, supra note 124, at 1262 (finding that various studies do not support public's
and policymakers' negative perception of punitive damages). Saks posits that "in light of the
empirical evidence [about punitive damages], the more interesting question might be how
such mistaken beliefs came about and how the level of fear rose to the heights that it has." Id.
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to large verdicts, 177 or perhaps it derives from the claims of the in-
dustry groups themselves.
If the threat of punitive damages is having a deterrent effect that
is out of proportion to its real threat and thus "overdeterring" man-
ufacturers,178 should legislation such as the regulatory compliance
provision of Senate bill 640 be enacted to dispel it? The answer
must be no. A baseless fear, especially one that may be attributable
in part to the claims of the business community itself, should not be
a basis for legislation. If the fear is not baseless, industry has the
burden of proving it is not. Only industry has the data to establish
the cause and effect relationship, if any, between the product liabil-
ity system and the claimed unreasonable hardships on the business
community. With respect to regulatory compliance provisions like
those contained in Senate bill 640, the industries in question need
to establish clearly the connection between the threat of punitive
awards and the alleged overdeterrence and economic ruin. At the
very least, they should provide examples of cases where excessive or
unwarranted punitive damages were awarded and ultimately paid by
defendant corporations. To date, they have not done so.
CONCLUSION
This Article began by expressing grave reservations about any
regulatory compliance defense, even for closely regulated products.
It considered the narrowly framed defense in Senate bill 640 to be a
modest proposal, however. The Article assessed the impact of the
compliance defense on plaintiffs and product safety and found that,
while negative, the impact is somewhat limited. After carefully con-
sidering whether the compliance defense might be warranted as a
means of curbing unreasonable punitive damages claims, one is
compelled to conclude that no justification exists for even this lim-
ited regulatory compliance defense. No punitive damages crisis has
been established, either through empirical studies or through data
supplied by industry. Until it is, the proposed compliance defense
should not be enacted.
177. See supra notes 135, 155 and accompanying text (discussing enormous attention that
punitive damages issue receives).
178. See Saks, supra note 124, at 1284 (stating that "[o]ne of the greatest increases in costs
associated with litigation may grow not out of lawsuits themselves, but out of irrational fears
of lawsuits-irrational in that they respond not to the actual behavior of the tort litigation
system but to inaccurate beliefs about that behavior").
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